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Abstract  
It is shown that assumptions about risk aversion, usually studied under the pre- 
supposition of expected utility maximization, have a surprising extra merit at an 
earlier stage of the measurement work: together with the sure-thing principle, 
these assumptions imply subjective expected utility maximization for monotonic 
continuous weak orders. 
1. In t roduct ion  
There has not yet been obtained acharacterization f subjective xpected utility 
maximization i the literature that is fully satisfactory in the sense of using necessary 
and sufficient conditions that are all empirically meaningful and have a clear intuitive 
meaning. The main nonnecessary condition used by Savage [7] is his P6, a kind of 
continuity condition, requiring some structure on the state space, which must be 
"fine". The main normecessary condition used in Wakker [9-11]  is a continuity 
condition, requiring structure on the consequence space, which also must be "f'me" 
in some sense. 
Because of the frequent use of subjective xpected utility models and all kinds 
of special forms of these, further "derivations" seem desirable. A derivation of a 
(specified form of a) subjective expected utility model gives a list of conditions 
sufficient for the applicability of the model. It is desirable that the list be as short as 
possible, with as many as possible behaviourally meaningful conditions (such as 
Savage's P3, the "sure-thing principle", and his P4, ensuring the existence of a "more 
probable than" relation; or Wakker's "cardinal coordinate independence", a strengthen- 
ing of the sure-thing principle), with few technical conditions (such as the "Archimedean 
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axioms" in Krantz et al. [5], see Adams et al. [1]), and with as few conditions as 
possible that have an unclear empirical status (such as P6 in Savage [7], and con- 
tinuity in Wakker [9-11]  ). 
In this paper we shall restrict attention to preference relations of decision 
makers who face uncertainty about the monetary consequences of possible actions. 
We shall derive, for finite state spaces, the subjective xpected utility model with 
risk aversion and nonincreasing (or nondecreasing; or constant; or constant relative) 
risk aversion. It will be shown that these assumptions on risk aversion simplify the 
derivation of subjective xpected utility maximization by making superfluous Savage's 
P4 or Wakker's cardinal coordinate independence strengthening of the sure-thing 
principle. The only nonbehavioural nd nonnecessary condition that we shall use is 
continuity of the preference relation, amounting to continuity of the utility function. 
The proof of our main result, theorem 3.3, is based on the adaption of theorems 
of Pratt [6] to the case of continuous (not necessarily differentiable) utility functions, 
and to the context of decision making under uncertainty (without all probability 
distributions available), as it has been given in Wakker et al. [12] ; on a theorem of 
Debreu [2] for additively decomposable r presenting functions; and on a theorem 
of Debreu and Koopmans [3] on differentiability properties of additively decom- 
posable quasiconvex functions. 
Subsequent theorems use a result of Stehling [8] on additively decomposable 
homothetic functions. 
2. Decis ion mak ing under  uncer ta in ty  
Let S = { s 1 . . . . .  s n } denote a finite state space, elements of which are (possible) 
states (of nature). Exactly one is the true state, the others are untrue. By (¢, we denote 
a nondegenerate interval, i.e. a convex subset of /R with more than one, so uncount- 
ably many, elements. Elements of ~e~ are consequences, and are interpreted as amounts 
of money. Elements of(~ n are called acts. An act x = (x~ . . . . .  Xn) yields conse- 
quence x i if state j is the true state. 
Let ~ be a binary relation on ~gn that denotes the preference relation of a 
decision maker who is uncertain about which state of nature is the true one. We write 
x~y for y ~ x, x ~yfor  Ix ~yandy~x] ,  x ~-y for [x~yandnoty  ~_x] ,x-~y 
for y 5- x. We call ~ a weak order if it is complete (x ~_ y or y ~_ x for all x, y) and 
transitive., Further, _~ is continuous if {x : x _ y} and {x : x _~ y } are closed for all y, 
and E is convex if {x 'x  ~_y} is convex for every y. In this paper, ~ will always be 
strongly monotonic, i.e. x ~-y whenever x I >f yj for all j, and x v~ y. This implies 
that no state of nature is considered impossible, and that all coordinates are "essential" 
(see definition 2.8), i.e. have influence on the preference relation. 
A function V:~n-+IR  represents ~_ if [x kY  ¢" V(x) >1 V(y)] for all 
x, y E ~. n. V is additively decomposable if there exist V i : "~ ~/R ,  j = 1, . . .  , n, 
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such that V(x) = ~; Vi(xj) for all x. Such Vj's are called additive value functions 
(for ~_ ) if 1" also represents ~- . 
NOTATION 2.1 
For 1 ~ i ~< n, x E (en, c~ E ~4, x_ is  is (x with x i replaced by ~x). If further 
1 ~< j ~< n, j ~ i, ~ E (e, then (x_i , j~, (J) is (x with x i replaced by ~, x] by/~). 
NOTATION 2.2 
For a E ~(,;, ~ is (og ~ . . . . .  ~). 
DEFINITION 2,3 
We say ~ satisfies the sure-thing principle if for all x, y E ,gn, 1 <<. i <~ n, 
X_iOt ~ y_iot ¢~ X_i(J ~_ y_i[J. 
One can see that ~-satisfies the sure-thing principle if and only if: 
[x ~ y "~ u ~ w] whenever for each i either [x i = u s and Yi = wi] or [x i = Yi and 
u s = wi]. This latter condition is derived from the sure-thing principle by (finiteness of 
S and) substitution, one by one, of v i and w i for x i and Yi, for all those i for which 
xi = Yi, vi = wi, and by application of the sure-thing principle after every substitution. 
The second formulation of the sure-thing principle is the one used in Savage [7]. 
DEFINITION 2.4 
We call [~n,  ~ , (pi)jn= 1' U] a subjective expected utility (SEU) model 
( for ~_ ) if the pj's are nonnegative r al numbers, summing to 1, and U is a function 
from ~,5 to/R,  such that ~_ is represented by the function V:~¢ n ~/R ,  defined by 
V(x): = ZT= 1 p jU(x j )  for all x. 
We then call pj the (subjective) probability for state s i, U the (subjective) 
utility function, and V(x)  the (subjective) expected utility o f  x. 
For a given SEU model [~n, ~,  (p/)jn= 1, U], ~ is risk averse if, for all 
X E ~C n'~. . 
x .Z p jx i , . . . ,  . (2.I) 
1=1 
It should be noted that this property requires the probabilities to be known. We have 
the following well-known characterization: 
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THEOREM 2.5 
Let [~n, ~,  (p/)p= t, U] be an SEUmodel for ~, with n >t 2, U continuous, 
and ~ strictly monotonic. Then the following three statements are equivalent: 
(i) "U is concave". 
(ii) "~- is risk averse ", 
(iii) "~ is convex". 
The properties introduced below usually are considered only in the presence of 
risk aversion. We prefer to introduce them in general. 
DEFINITION 2.6 
The preference relation _~ has nonincreasing [respectively, nondecreasing; or 
constant] (absolute) risk aversion if for all e >I 0 [respectively, e ~< 0; or e E /R  ], 
and for all x, x + ~ in q~ n, ~, a + e E ~, we have: 
x ~- ~ =~x +~ ~- ~ +~'. 
DEFINITION 2.7 
The preference r lation _~ has constant relative risk aversion if for all ~, E /R  ÷÷, 
x, ~x E ~n, a, ~ E ~,we have: 
x~-~=hx~_~-~.  
The latter property, while conceptually different, can formally be identified 
with the condition of "homotheticity" from consumer demand theory. The following 
property will be used only in reference to other papers: 
DEFINITION 2.8 
Coordinate (or index) i is essential if there exist x, a such that x_t a ~- x. 
3. Subjective expected utility for nonincreasing or nondecreasing 
risk aversion 
In the lemma below, Vr(~) [respectively, V~(a); or V'(a)] denotes the right- 
derivative [respectively, the left,'derivative; or the derivative] in a of a function V. 
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LEMMA 3.1 
Let n /> 2. Let V 1 , . . . , V n be continuous trictly increasing additive value 
functions for _~. Let_  be convex, and have nonincreasing risk aversion. Let 
ol E int (~),/3 E int (%), oL > 3. Let i =~ ]. Then: 
v/r(°) ~(fl) ~ Vj~(t~) v/r(~) (3.1) 
whenever the derivatives are defined. 
Proof 
k** 
We take (ok)~=l , ( r )k=l  E/R++ such that :ok  j, 0, r k J,O, tx+r  k and 
/3 - o k are in % for all k, V/(~ + r k) - V/(~) = V](~) - V/(~ - ok) for all k. Such a k 
and r k exist by continuity and strict increasingness of Vt and Vj. For all k, it follows 
that 
(~-i,j(~ +rk), (/3- ak)) ~ ~. 
By nonincreasing risk aversion, it follows that: 
(~_~,j(~ + r~), (a -  °k)) ~ ~; 
i.e., 
~(,~ + ~k) _ ~(~) >/~(~) _ ~(~ _ ok) 
for all k. We obtain: 
lim [~(~ +~.k)_ ~(~)] [~(~)_ 5(~_ Ok)]/~kok 
f> lim [~(~) -  ~e '  - ok)] [~(~ +~k) _ V,(~)]/ok~ k = 5%)~'(~). 
REMARK 3.2 
I f  one replaces nonincreasing risk aversion in the above l mma by nondecreasing 
risk aversion, then 
~r(, , )§~(~) ~< §~(~)~r(~).  (3.2) 
The proof is analogous to the one above. 
We are now ready for our main theorem. 
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THEOREM 3.3 
Let n >/3. The following three statements are equivalent forthe nondegenerate 
interval -~ and the preference r lation k on %n : 
(i) "There exists an SEU model [%n, ~ , (pi)/n= 1, U] for ~,  with all 
Pi > 0, and with U continuous, strictly increasing, concave; further- 
more, for all a ~> ~/> 7 > 6 in %, the function 
e ~ [u (a  + e) - u(t3 + e)] / [u (v  + e) - U(~ + e)] (3.3) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
is nondecreasing onits domain". 
"There exists an SEU model [~-~", ~ ,  (P])}~=l, U] for k,  with all 
Pi > O, U continuous, trictly increasing. Further, _ is risk averse, and 
has nonincreasing risk aversion". 
"The preference relation k is a continuous trongly monotonic weak 
order, it satisfies the sure-thing principle, is convex, and has nonincreasing 
risk aversion". 
Proof 
Part of the equivalence of (i) and (ii) follows from theorem 2.5. We concentrate 
on the remainder of the equivalence of (i) and (ii). This does not follow from Pratt ([6], 
mainly (e) in theorem 1), firstly because his U is assumed twice continuously differen- 
tiable, and secondly because his context is decision making under isk, with all proba- 
bility distributions available, whereas we have only a fixed and finite number of 
probabilities p~ . . . . .  Pn available. The only result in the literature known to us from 
which (i) ¢, (ii) can be derived is Wakker et al. ([12], theorem 4.1 and lemma A.7.4), 
mainly by comparing ~ with ~',  defined by x k'  Y if x - ~ k Y - ~, on an appro- 
priate domain. For brevity, we omit elaboration. 
The implication (ii) =~ (iii) is straightforward, so we finally assume (iii) and 
derive (ii). 
By strong monotonicity, all (so at least three) coordinates are essential. Since 
___ is a continuous weak order, satisfying the sure-thing principle, theorem 3 of 
Debreu [2] implies that there exist continuous additive value functions (V/)/n= x for 
k .  Further, we may assume that for some arbitrary fixed/a ° E ~, V/(# °) = 0 for all/'. 
By strong monotonicity, the ~'s are strictly increasing. The main problem will now be 
to show: 
The Vi"s are proportional. 
t l  To see this, first we note that the function V, assigning El = 1 Vi(xi) to every x, repre- 
sents a convex ~, and hence is quasiconcave. It now follows easily from the n-dimen- 
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sional analogue of theorem 3 in Debreu and Koopmans [3] that, for all i, on int((~): 
V/r and Vi ~ are defined and finite, V/r is continuous on the right, V/2 is continuous on 
the left, and at every point outside a countable set E t, V/is differentiable. 
Let E = UE i, so E is countable. On [int(qg)] \E,  all V/ are differentiable. 
Hence, two applications of lemma 3.1 give, for all i, j: 
V/ (~) V]' (3) = I~'(a)~'(3) for all a,/3 E [intC£)] \E.  
It follows from this that there exist ] and real numbers (ai)/7= 1 such that V/' = o i V~ 
on [inter,)] \E  for all i. Since E is countable and V/r, V/r are continuous on the right 
everywhere on int(r~), ~r = ai v/r follows on all of intC~); analogously, ~ = o i 1~ ~. 
Hence, V~ - o i~ has derivative 0 on int(%), and so is constant. Since V/(g °) = 0 
= t~(g°), the constant is zero, so continuity ields Vii = o i V] on all of'(,,, for all i: 
The ~'s indeed are proportional. 
By strict increasingness of the V/'s, all ai's are positive. We define 
U:= (ETc=] ok)V/ and p i '=a i / ) ]~=iok .  This gives an SEU model for ~.  Since, by 
theorem 2.5, convexity of ___ implies risk aversion, everything of (ii) follows. [] 
In (iii) above, we have given a characterization f the quantitative model in 
(i), completely in terms of properties directly in terms of the preference relation _5-. 
Hence, we did not use the property of risk aversion in (iii), as this needs the proba- 
bilities in its definition. In the context of decision making under uncertainty (unlike 
the context of decision making under isk), probabilities are not primitives. 
One can replace nonincreasing risk aversion by nondecreasing risk aversion 
in (ii) and (iii) above if one replaces nondecreasingness of the function defined in 
(3.3) by nonincreasingness. Analogously, one can of course substitute "constant risk 
aversion" in (ii) and (iii), and constantness of the function defined in (3.3). In the 
latter case, either U is affine or exponential, as can be derived from theorem 3.5 in 
the sequel. Finally, if '~ =/R++, one can replace "nonincreasing risk aversion" in 
(ii) and (iii) above by "constant relative risk aversion" if one replaces the statement 
on the function defined in (3.3) by the statement that U: ~ ~ loga, or U : a ~, Xet °, 
as can be derived from theorem 3.4 in the sequel. 
For theorem 3.3, we do not need the assumption of concavity in (i), of risk 
aversion in (ii), and of convexity in (iii) i f '¢ =/R and we have constant absolute 
risk aversion, or if*¢ =/R++ and we have constant relative risk aversion. First, we 
give the latter result, this being directly derivable from Stehling [8]. 
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THEOREM 3.4 
Let n /> 3. Let ~ =/R.+. The following two statements areequivalent for the 
preference r lation ~ on %n: 
(i) "There exists an SEU model [(¢n, ___, (pj)7= z, U] for ___, with all 
Pi > 0, and either U : ct ~- Xo~ o for some ;~, p E /R  with Xp > 0, or 
U : 0t ~ logt~". 
(ii) "The preference relation ~ is a continuous trongly monotonic weak 
order, it satisfies the sure-thing principle, and has constant relative risk 
aversion". 
eroo[ 
Suppose (i). Then, for any /~ > 0, x E ~n, for the expected utility EU, 
EU(/ax) =/IPEU(x) or EU(I~x) =/l + EU(x). Constant relative risk aversion and all 
of(ii) follow straightforwardly from this. So we suppose (ii) and derive (i). 
By strong monotonicity, every coordinate is '~essential". By theorem 3 of 
Debreu [2], there exist continuous additive value functions (~)7= a for ~.  By strong 
monotonicity, every I~ is strictly increasing. Define V: ~n ~/R ,  ¢~: '~-+/R, 
W : ~n ~/R  by: 
V:x  ,-,ZVj(x.), (o:o,~, v(~), w x ~,~- '  o v(~). 
Then V and W represent ~; W(~) = a; [W(x) = ot =~x ~ ~], so W assigns to 
each x its "certainty equivalent". Also, W(lax) = I.tW(x) for/a > 0 (W is "linearly 
homogeneous", o V is "homothetic"). By Stehling ([8], theorem 2), or Eichhorn 
([4], theorem 2.5.2), either: 
or: 
V:x  ~ la 
V:x  ~, qJ 
j= l  
for a continuous strictly increasing ~, 
positive #, and nonzero p ~ . . . . .  Pn 
that sum to one, 
for a continuous strictly increasing ~O, 
positive o~ . . . .  ,o n, and nonzero p. 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
In the case of (3.4), V is ,a strictly increasing transform of x ~ I Ixf j, and so, 
by taking logarithms, of x ~ Zpflog(xj). By strict increasingness of every Vj, every Pi 
is positive. So indeed we have an SEU model for k,  with U: a ~ logot. 
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Next, suppose (3.5). First, assume p :> 0. Then V is a strictly increasing 
transform of T~ojxf. We therefore have an SEU model for ~,  with pi:= ai/zn= 1 a i 
for every ], and U : o~ ~ a p, so k = 1 in (i) above. 
Finally, suppose (3.5), with p < 0. Then V is a strictly decreasing transform 
of x ~, ~,aix f ,  so a strictly increasing transform o fx  ~ ~,tr j ( -x f ) .  We have an SEU 
model for ~-, with Pi := ai/T~n= 1 al for every ], and U: a ~ - (aP) ,  so in (i) above, 
k= -1 .  [] 
From this, we derive: 
THEOREM 3.5 
Let n /> 3. Let '~ =/R. The following two statements are equivalent for the 
preference r lation k on ,~n: 
(i) "There exists an SEU model [,~n, ~, (pi)7=1, U] for ~-, with all 
Pi > 0,and Uidentity, or U: a ~ ;ke p~ forsome k,p E /R  with kp > 0". 
(ii) "The preference relation "_e- is a continuous trongly monotonic weak 
order, it satisfies the sure-thing principle, and has constant absolute risk 
aversion ". 
eroo/ 
Suppose (i). Then for any p :> O, x E r~n, the expected util ity EU(x) has 
EU(x + p) = ePPEU(x) or EU(x + p) = p + EU(x). Constant absolute risk aversion 
and all of( i i )  follow straightforwardly. So now we suppose (ii), and derive (i). 
Define L'./R++n _+/Rn by L: (x 1, . . . ,Xn) ~ (log(x l), . . . ,log(Xn) , and 
define :--' on /R n by x ~ 'y  iff L(x )  ~ L (y ) .  Then it follows straightforwarflty =-- "1-0" 
that ~' satisfies (ii) of theorem 3.4. We obtain, for all x ,y  E IR n : 
x ~_ y ~L- l (x )  ~_' L - ' (y )  "~'~pjV(eXj )  >~EpiU(eYJ) ,  
with U, Pi' and also ~,p as in (i) of theorem 3.4. This implies (i) of theorem 3.5. [] 
Most probably, the last two theorems also hold for any interval '~ C/R++, 
respectively, '~C/R ,  but we do not know of a reference where the analogue of 
Stehling's [8] theorem, needed to prove this, is available. 
We have not considered the case of n = 2. One may replace n >/2 by n = 2 
in theorems 3.3 to 3.5 if one adds the so-called "Thomsen condition" (see Krantz 
et al. [5], definition 6.3) in (iii) of theorem 3.3 and (ii) of theorems 3.4 and 3.5. 
For n = 1, the results are rather different; this concerns the case of decision making 
under certainty (and ordinal utility). 
Uniqueness results in our theorems are standard, the utility function is always 
cardinal, and the subjective probabilities are uniquely determined. 
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4. Conclusion 
The approach by which the use of specified forms of subjective expected 
utility models is usually justified reflects the historical development of the theory 
of  subjective expected utility maximization. Usually, in a first stage conditions are 
found, and justified, that are sufficient (and possibly necessary) for the existence of 
a subjective expected utility model without any further specification (for instance, 
the conditions in Savage [7]). Once this has been done, in a second stage behavioural 
conditions are found, and justified, which are sufficient (and possibly necessary) to 
obtain the desired specified form of the subjective xpected utility model. 
This paper has shown that a one-stage approach may lead to stronger esults 
because assumptions on risk aversion, usually made in later stages, simplify the deriva- 
tion in the first stage of th~ ~ubjective expected utility model itself. 
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